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Since the Cold War, debate in the West over the future of the international order has fixated upon the discourse of moral liberalism. Moral liberals envision a liberal democratic world 
order, focus on the individual, and invoke the need to secure univer-
sal human rights—derived variously from naturalistic, consensus, 
and functional theories, and construed generally to mean claims to 
human security (i.e., freedom from fear and want)—as justification 
for interventionist responses, and to claim moral high ground (i.e., 
“just war”) in the international arena.* 
During the 1990s and 2000s, two positions within this dis-
course—the cosmopolitan and the hegemonic—bifurcated the 
vast majority of Western statesmen, policymakers, and informed 
citizens participating in public political discussion. While both 
cosmopolitan and hegemonic moral liberals intend to advance the 
type of humanitarian internationalism described above, they differ 
in the means they propose and the concretized institutional ends 
they seek. "e schism staged a “choice” for denizens of the West to 
resolve.
"e cosmopolitans aspire to formally constitutionalize inter-
national law to the point of forging a new kind of “world citizen-
ship” capable of guaranteeing such a set of human rights. To the 
cosmopolitans, the demands of these rights must countervail the 
traditional demands of state sovereignty and formal international
* I use the term “moral liberalism” to distinguish between the specific understanding outlined 
above, and other uses of the term “liberal.” "ese include “IR liberalism,” which asserts an 
empirical relationship between international institutions and international political behavior, 
“classical market liberalism,” which extracts political principles from the ideal conditions for 
capital accumulation, “liberal constitutionalism,” which divides power and ascribes rights to 
guarantee the equal liberty and worth of individuals from their  government, and “Liberalism,” 
which refers to a progressive social-democratic partisan ideology in modern Western nations.  
Now a JD candidate at Stanford Law School, Adam S. Sieff graduated from Columbia University 
in 2011 summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa with Honors in political science. His honors thesis, 
from which this article was adapted, was awarded the university's Charles A. Beard Prize in 
political science. He plans to be a community advocate in his home state of California.
59Journal of Politics & Society
law. For them, the legalistic discourse of sovereignty, and the in-
herently political nature of international organizations (i.e., that 
international organizations are ultimately derivative of states with 
multiple and regularly conflicting interests, values and aspirations) 
must not be permitted to interfere with humanitarian “rescue” op-
erations in the face of vast and offensive violations of international 
law.1 To some, forcing the actual violation of extant international 
laws (i.e., pursuing unauthorized unilateral “humanitarian” ac-
tions)—analogous to civil disobedience—is the only promising 
course for reform.2 Regardless, under the cosmopolitan model, the 
political and legal concept of state sovereignty is reduced to a func-
tional “responsibility to protect” that, should the state default on 
its obligation, could be appropriated to the global community. "is 
would in turn coordinate the dissolution and subsequent recon-
struction of the “failed” state.3 United Nations reform—meaning 
mostly measures that legally clarify and materially secure additional 
resources to “guarantee the effective implementation of resolutions 
of the Security Council”—is at the heart of this vision.4 Moreover, 
cosmopolitans argue that UN action has already borne and legiti-
mized the concept of cosmopolitan global citizenship by recogniz-
ing individuals as immediate subjects of international law (i.e., with 
standing in international courts). To the extent that the “constitu-
tional quality” of the UN Charter and other global compacts are 
still informal, they further contend it will be through future UN 
action that the formal constitutionalization of international law is 
eventually achieved.5 
 By contrast, hegemonic internationalism eschews interna-
tional law and instead calls for the unilateral action of a benevolent 
hegemon to catalyze the proliferation of liberal democracy, and 
guarantee the provision of similarly defined human rights to secu-
rity and protection. Like the cosmopolitans, liberal hegemons also 
insist that the discourses of state sovereignty and public interna-
tional law have become irrelevant. However, they propose replac-
ing the system of states with a project of benevolent imperialism 
intended to provide the basic physical security owed to individuals 
across the globe. From this perspective, global governance and “hu-
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manitarian interventions” are merely vehicles for the empire’s rule.6 
Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1990, Charles Krauthammer heralded 
the position bluntly:
 Why it should matter to Americans that their actions get a Se-
curity Council nod from Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of Ti-
ananmen Square is beyond me. But to many Americans it mat-
ters. It is largely for this reason that American political leaders 
must be sure to dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing. 
!e danger, of course, is that they might come to believe their 
own pretense.7
Institutionally, these hegemonic liberals seek to maintain the 
international structure of formally independent states, but aspire 
to organize and align them imperially beneath the peace-securing 
hegemon. Under this model, the internal actions, ambitions, and 
claims of individual states (including claims to sovereign equality 
and non-intervention) would be de facto subject to the approval 
of the hegemon, whose judgment is supreme due not only to its 
material power, but also an implicit contract it believes to hold with 
the world’s nations. !e world society that hegemonic liberals posit 
would still be integrated—modern technology and economics, if 
nothing else, requires that it be so—but only at the level of mar-
ket interactions and imperial interventions, and not by anything 
amounting to political relations between sovereign equals, let alone 
actual world citizens. 
On the other hand, constitutional cosmopolitans endeavor to 
design a highly integrated, law-governed and politically constituted 
world society. !e distinction between internal and external ac-
tions of individual states would be blurred, and in any case shaped 
by the collective attitudes and ideas of a transnational political 
body. !e essence of such a politically constituted world society 
is that it would be composed both of states and citizens. !e flow 
of legitimation would thus take two paths converging on a single 
world organization: on the one hand, from individuals qua “nation-
al citizens” via a corresponding nation-state to the transnational 
negotiation system (i.e., diplomacy, partisan politics, civil society 
organization) that would be “responsible within the framework of 
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the international community for issues of global domestic politics”; 
on the other hand, from individuals qua “cosmopolitan citizens” via 
an international community composed of member states “respon-
sive to their citizens, and to the peace and human rights policy of 
the world organization.”8 
!at neither a hegemonic nor cosmopolitan order has been 
institutionalized is ultimately due to the indecisiveness of the 
world’s most influential actor. Unable to make a choice that would 
end the schism, the United States has been left caught in a muddled 
state of perpetual “choosing” for nearly twenty years. It is no secret 
that, since 1992, the United States has flirted with both major vi-
sions.* In one respect, the United States has pursued cosmopolitan 
policies of selective engagement and cooperative security (e.g., UN-
sanctioned activities in Somalia, the Balkans, and Iraq, as well as 
sanctions levied against Iran, North Korea, and others) that have 
acceded power to the UN. At the same time, the United States has 
also advanced a decidedly hegemonic agenda (e.g., Iraq). 
Without the West’s most influential nation consistently ad-
vocating a path forward, international order has bent toward the 
fundamental moral liberalism of the two predominant alternatives. 
!is foundation bears assumptions about politics and the human 
condition—notable for their effect upon discourses affecting hu-
man rights, sovereignty, and political life itself—that portend to 
embed themselves into any emerging global political formation. 
Before world order coalesces into such a structure, it is impera-
tive that the assumptions underlying moral liberalism—and their 
consequences for the social world—are fully evaluated, and that 
alternatives are fully explored. Criticism of the first wave of moral 
liberalism provides solid ground for such an effort.
 LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1919-1939
In the years that followed World War I, moralistic models of 
* For a breakdown and illustration of U.S. inconsistency, see: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. 
Ross  “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, 21 (1999): p. 3, pp. 
5–53. 
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political order attracted the energies of theorists and the aspira-
tions of statesmen. !e Great War, Woodrow Wilson announced 
in January 1918, “will be recalled as the culminating and final war 
for human liberty.”9 We now know that his idealism would lead to 
tragic disappointment: the explosion of a second total war—this 
one perhaps even more repugnant than the first—exposed critical 
oversights in the moral liberal platform that, through the structure 
of the League of Nations, seemed to have embraced dimensions of 
both the hegemonic and cosmopolitan varieties. 
It was in this context that Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904–
1980) began writing about politics. Morgenthau traced the root of 
social and political problems in the United States during the inter-
war period back to the fundaments of moral liberalism: an aversion 
to politics and a celebration of the private individual. To him, these 
were vestiges of the bourgeois classical liberalism forged in early 
modern Europe. Both classical liberalism and its vestiges, Morgen-
thau argued, could not be understood outside the context of the 
former’s origins among early modern Europe’s rising middle classes 
and their attempt to posit an alternative social and political order 
that challenged the authority and power of the feudal aristocracy.10 
!e building block of the social theory that the bourgeois lib-
erals constructed was a material and rational individual “self ” that 
possessed tangible interests (above all physical security) and that 
acted in the calculated private pursuit of those interests. When 
those interests became stymied by the political power of the aris-
tocracy, the bourgeois liberals, Morgenthau argued, came to iden-
tify political action with the aspiration for power, which they in 
turn associated with “a particular manifestation of a ‘lust’ for domi-
nation.” Consequently, classic liberals “identified opposition to aris-
tocratic politics with hostility to any kind of politics.”11 
In its most basic form, classic liberalism was thus a type of 
anti-political “market liberalism.” It elaborated a utilitarian ethics 
that moralized private economic pursuits, as well as a democratic 
theory that reduced politics into the systematized aggregation of 
competing interests. Morgenthau contends that the construction 
divorced individual and social “lifeworlds” from the “political activi-
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ties” that were considered part and parcel of aristocratic claims to 
authority and power. !e process of this separation reduced under-
standings of social and political life into scientific questions of ma-
terial fact and calculations of interest. Politics, as an autonomous 
sphere of human activity distinct from the pursuit of self-interest, 
was subsequently dismissed or devalued in later iterations of liberal 
thought.12
Inheriting this tradition, and rocked by the global carnage of 
1914–1917, early twentieth-century moral liberals turned their at-
tention to war as the latest political obstruction to private life and 
physical security. Politics, which had been reduced by their intel-
lectual ancestors to aristocratic tyranny and an abominable “lust for 
power,” now became reduced to abhorrently violent interstate ag-
gression. !rough broad treaties, narrow pacts, and even attempts 
at world federation, moral liberals aspired to replace international 
politics with an international “harmony of interests.” 
Ultimately, Morgenthau argued that a mistaken understand-
ing of what political action constituted, and what the human “lust 
for power” represented, had led to the prompt return of total war 
when appeasement failed and potential allies, averse to fighting, 
refused to act early enough. For him, mid-century moral liberals 
failed to understand that political action was much more than just 
“power-politics,” and as such could not be expelled from the social 
world. I interpret Morgenthau to argue that, from the ontological 
position that it is man’s purpose to encounter his own being, poli-
tics constitutes the quintessence of humanity insofar as political 
action is the activity through which men disclose and assert them-
selves as equal, unique agents. !at the “tragic” ramifications of po-
litical activity are not always as elegant as the construction itself, 
and that sometimes the process of self-determination is sluggish 
and chaotic, are therefore not justifications to abolish politics alto-
gether. Rather, as Morgenthau seems to assert, we would do best 
to contain and navigate the tragedies of political action through the 
adoption of an ethic of responsibility. 
Today, in defiance of these intuitions, contemporary moral 
liberals of both the cosmopolitan and hegemonic variety aspire 
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to take the project of depoliticization to its furthest extents yet. 
!rough the distinct modes previously described, both point to-
ward the external disaggregation of political communities and the 
quashing of their internal political activities, ostensibly for their 
own benefit. Moreover, the content of the universal rights doctrine 
they both seek to secure fails to assert mankind’s need for polity 
and therefore not only misses the point, but in fact excludes many 
(i.e., the stateless and/or politically unincorporated) from the en-
joyment of these “universal” rights altogether. At the same time, the 
continued development of this doctrine as an acceptable justifica-
tion to unilaterally or selectively reject traditional non-intervention 
arguments provides pretense for speciously benevolent hegemons 
or imperial coalitions to aggrandize beneath a banner of appar-
ent justice. !e menace of total war ultimately rises from the mass 
graves of the last go-around as the moral stakes for war are once 
again elevated to the level of absolute imperatives. 
!e great failure of moral liberalism is thus a failure to grasp 
the concept of the political.  In the chapters that follow, I endeavor 
to present an alternative that does. To do so, I will reconstruct what 
I argue is a genuine reading of Morgenthau’s international political 
thought by critically reexamining two generations of interpreta-
tions. I argue that Morgenthau’s “political conception” of interna-
tional order has been lost in these interpretations. I call his a “po-
litical” conception because the moral values upon which his theory 
is based are derived specifically from the ontological Aristotelian 
notion of man as a “political animal,” to which I have alluded previ-
ously. !is usage should not be confused with either the Rawlsian 
or the power-political senses of the construction.* 
 I begin in Section I by retracing the character of Morgen-
thau’s ideas back to the writings and ideas of Nietzsche and Weber, 
* In the Rawlsian sense, a “political conception” refers to a non-metaphysical “neutral” basis upon 
which a diverse set of peoples can find an “overlapping consensus” to justify a common concept 
of justice that can be used to gauge the legitimacy of basic shared political and social institutions. 
In the power-political sense, a “political” conception is one that considers the constant self-
preservatory accumulation of power to be the principal feature of the social world. Neither 
denotes the particular meaning I assign. For examples of each, see: Rawls, “!e Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): pp. 1–25; John J. Mearsheimer, 
!e Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 4–8, pp. 39–47. 
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from whom they rightly derive, developing what I argue is Morgen-
thau’s actual conceptual foundation. In Section II, I then construct 
an international normative theory that extends from this founda-
tion: a political conception of international order centered on the 
moral value of political action, the state, and the state-system. 
I argue that the international system that emerges from this 
political conception is legally instituted upon the twin pillars of 
sovereign-equality and politically conceived human rights. !is 
“dualistic” formation, which reconciles universal human rights with 
sovereign equality through a program of constitutional pluralism, 
contrasts with the cosmopolitan position that privileges human 
rights above sovereignty altogether. It is also at odds with the he-
gemonic position that combines the moral liberal concept of uni-
versal rights with a principle of hierarchical sovereign-inequality. A 
politically conceived international order thereby depicts a human 
political status analytically located between the global citizenship 
and imperial vassalage of the two liberalisms. 
!rough his vision for such an order, Morgenthau reminds us 
not to neglect the basic political character of humanity in crafting 
an international order. His ideas articulate a viable and compelling 
alternative that speaks to man’s political nature, the frequent trag-
edy of his moral aspirations, and ultimately a cautious optimism 
for the better angels of his judgment. 
1. THE HUMAN CONDITION AND THE CONCEPT OF 
THE POLITICAL*
In what follows, I trace the origins of Morgenthau’s political 
thought to Nietzsche and explore how Nietzsche had influenced 
Morgenthau’s understanding of the political and the human condi-
tion in general. I then focus on how Weber’s ideas—specifically, 
* In this chapter, I build upon a selection of recent revisionist literature that more closely 
examined Morgenthau’s theoretical writings, as well as his personal diaries and papers. !ese 
include: Christoph Frei, Hans. J Morgenthau (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2001), pp. 93-227; William E. Scheuerman, Morgenthau (Boston: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 
40–195; Michael C. Williams, !e Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 82–127, pp. 169–210. 
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value pluralism and the ethic of responsibility—refined those con-
ceptions and informed the political ethic that Morgenthau would 
come to embrace as necessary in a tragic and disenchanted moder-
nity. 
8LI8VEKMGEWE'SRHMXMSRSJ,YQER)\MWXIRGI*
Morgenthau’s sense that the human condition was tragic 
evolved from a belief in the unbridgeable chasm between human 
desire and capability, he inherited from Nietzsche. For Morgen-
thau, it was not our failure to refrain from desire, but rather the 
fact that certain desires unavoidably fall just out of reach—recall-
ing what Nietzsche called “the irremediable, ineluctable, inescap-
able”—that describes the tragic condition of human existence.13 
!is is a dominant theme throughout Morgenthau’s writings. “Sus-
pended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfill, and 
his animal nature in which he cannot remain,” Morgenthau wrote 
in Scientific Man, “man is forever condemned to experience the con-
trast between the longings of his mind and his actual condition as 
his personal, eminently human tragedy.”14 
Like Nietzsche, Morgenthau worried that the modern West 
had become not only content with denying the tragic character of 
the human condition, but also too eager to pursue utopia without 
regard for the efficacy or consequences of those pursuits. It had 
become, as per Nietzsche, a definite kind of sickness: “!e political 
and military crises of the thirties and forties … are but the outward 
manifestations of an intellectual, moral and political disease which 
has its roots in the basic philosophic assumptions of the age.”15 
!ese assumptions produced an idyllic intellectual fallacy that ig-
nored the permanence of tragic forces in the social world, particu-
larly those that stemmed from political action. For Morgenthau, 
the permanence of these tragic forces derived from two sources. 
First, human beings are simply unable to calculate and control 
the results of their actions. Once one acts, her action becomes an 
* !is subsection owes much to Frei’s translations of Morgenthau’s personal writings held at the 
Library of Congress.
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independent force that shapes, and is shaped by, unforeseen contin-
gencies. “While our hand carries the good intent to what seems to 
be its consummation,” Morgenthau writes, “the fruit of evil grows 
from the seed of noble thought.”16 Since social man owns various 
moral interests that are intertwined beyond his capacity to under-
stand, “while satisfying one, we must neglect others and the satis-
faction of one may even imply the positive violation of another … 
Whatever choice we make, we must do evil while we try to do good, 
for we must abandon one moral end in favor of another.”17 Sec-
ondly, in what Morgenthau calls political action, tragedy arises not 
merely from inevitable, unforeseen, and unintended contingencies, 
but in fact, “the very essence of the intention and very life-blood of 
the action.”18 !is has to do with the nature of political action as a 
“distinct sphere of human activity.” 
8LI4SPMXMGEP(VMZIERHXLI4SPMXMGEP
For Morgenthau, political action stems from the animus dom-
inandi—a “political drive” that he seems to have derived from Ni-
etzsche’s will to power. Morgenthau understood the will to power 
as the fundamental ontological force intrinsic in human nature that 
drives men to construct a transcendent identity. “It is of the same 
kind as the mystical desire for union with the universe,” Morgen-
thau wrote of the animus dominandi, “it attempts to push the indi-
vidual beyond his natural limits” toward the “transcendent goal” of 
self-discovery and disclosure.19 
It is crucial that the animus dominandi can only be satis-
fied through intersubjective action: fullness can only be attained 
through the engagement of other beings. !is is to say that it is a 
political drive. Since it originates in the spirit of man, the political is 
not merely a relationship between individuals, but it is also a qual-
ity within individuals that drives them together. To be human is to 
be homo politicus.20 Until man joins with other beings, “he cannot 
fulfill himself, he cannot become what he is destined to be.”21 As 
the human telos, political action constitutes the search and expres-
sion of meaning and identity. 
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It is important to note that, for Morgenthau, the political 
drive cannot achieve its ontological objectives through violence. 
!e political drive, insofar as it quests for the self-assertion of an 
individual being’s essence in an intersubjective space, necessitates 
an element of mutual recognition. !is is because the animus domi-
nandi (as manifested through political action) seeks not obedience 
from other beings, which might be sufficient for self-preservation, 
but in fact a connection with other beings that affirms the political 
actor’s essence.22 Once relations enter the realm of physical force, 
they are no longer “political” activities, and thus lose their value.
!e observable outcome of political action is inevitably a 
contest: agents in a shared space compete to have their disclosed 
identities, expressed as ideas, dominate one another to establish the 
basis for a collective union. !is is to say that even the most in-
spiring bonds unavoidably become entangled in what Morgenthau 
calls “a struggle for power.”23 Here we see why tragedy is present 
in the motive force behind political action: political action—for 
which success is measured by “the degree to which one is able to 
maintain, increase or demonstrate one’s power over others”—is al-
most always incongruous with moral action—the test of which is 
“the degree to which one is capable of treating others not as means 
to the actor’s ends, but as ends themselves.”24 As the acquisition 
of fullness comes to entail the partial sacrifice of moral yearnings, 
and, conversely, as the pursuit of moral conviction comes to inter-
fere with fundamental human aspirations, the human condition 
becomes ineluctably colored by tragedy. 
8LI)XLMGSJ6IWTSRWMFMPMX]ERHXLI2EXMSREP4YVTSWI*
While Nietzsche framed the human condition Morgenthau 
would come to accept as the basis for his thought, it was Weber 
who outlined the ethic that would be necessary to navigate its se-
verity. Weber defined the ethic of responsibility in “Politics as a 
Vocation.” Speaking in 1918, Weber sought to describe the char-
* Morgenthau originally had used the term “national interest.” He later revised it in his 1960 
Purpose of American Politics and began referring to the “national purpose.” I do the same.
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acteristics of political leadership urgently needed in a German 
government that, he worried, had become stymied by a “dehuman-
ized” and “detached” bureaucracy that had become rationalized 
beyond not only service to the public, but indeed service to any 
political cause whatsoever.25 !e description similarly targeted the 
would-be reformers—mostly pacifists, socialists, and other leftist 
groups—whose strict adherence to ideology and unwillingness to 
compromise prevented them from effectively mobilizing in any real 
capacity sufficient to catalyze reforms. In contrast to the paralyz-
ing and destructive ethics of ultimate ends that afflicted both the 
German bureaucracy and potential reformers, Weber promoted an 
ethic of responsibility:
For [a man who believes in the ethic of ultimate ends], if an ac-
tion of good intent leads to bad results then, in the actor’s eyes, 
not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men … is respon-
sible for the evil. However, a man who believes in an ethic of 
responsibility takes account of precisely the average deficiencies 
of people, and he does not feel in a position to burden others 
with the results of his own actions so far as he was able to foresee 
them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my actions.  
Morgenthau, ever aware of those “ethical paradoxes,” argues that 
this ethos is the best we have to resolve the tragedy of political ac-
tion: 
What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns 
others who must suffer from unwise action. What is done with 
good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results 
is morally defective for it violates the ethic of responsibility to 
which all action affecting others, and hence political action par 
excellence, is subject.26 
At the level of international politics, Morgenthau reformulates this 
as an ethic of the “national purpose.” According to it, a polity’s nor-
mative aspirations and interests are weighed against each other, as 
well as against universal values, to determine the degree to which 
each should be pursued according to a prudent evaluation of the 
consequences to which they are likely to lead.27 In so doing, an 
ethic is derived from political reality, and not the other way around. 
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An ethic of the national purpose acknowledges, as Weber did, 
“that very frequently, the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ 
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest,”28 and that the greatest nations 
“have contributed to the affairs of men more than the successful defense 
and promotion of their national interests.”29 "us, though it considers 
a community’s material interests in universal moral principles such 
as survival and prosperity, an ethic of the national purpose weighs 
these against the particular values that the community espouses, 
as well as certain universal values that transcend individual com-
munities.* Morgenthau understood nations as complex normatively 
constituted political communities, functioning first and foremost as fo-
rums for self-construction and identity-formation in which individuals 
have voluntarily joined together on the basis of shared political and cul-
tural beliefs. National purposes can therefore be as diverse as the various 
moral and political constitutions that a political community may have.† 
Statesmen subsequently face an array of considerations that must be 
balanced before reaching a conclusion that may jeopardize some at the 
expense of others. "us, the ethical test is whether or not the respon-
sible decision-making agent has prudently evaluated alternative courses 
of action and weighed potential consequences upon national purposes 
in reaching her decision. 
As might be evident at this point, each political community will 
have its own distinct national ethic emanating from its own weighted 
set of values and interests. "e variability of value inputs that might sup-
ply an ethic of national purpose with its navigational signposts reflects 
Morgenthau’s value-pluralistic conception of the political and the mod-
ern social world, which he also develops from Weber.
(MWIRGLERXQIRX:EPYI4PYVEPMWQERHXLI4SPMXMGEP6IZMWMXIH
"e diversity Morgenthau intuits derives itself from Weber’s 
* For Morgenthau, the perpetuation of the conditions necessary for the “good life” to flourish 
constitute such a universal value. What the “good life” is, and what these conditions are, will be 
discussed in section three. 
† "e “basic universal principles” which accompany a political conception of international order 
and confer legitimacy upon states and their national purposes will be explicated below. 
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theory of modernity. For Weber, modernity in the West sprang 
from the rationalization of the world that made it calculable. !e 
revelation of the underlying causal processes of observed phenome-
na manufactured a fact-value divide that “disenchanted” men of the 
magical mysteries of religion that had formerly sated his longing 
to find fullness in material reality, leaving a disenchanted world in 
which Christianity could no longer function as a transcendent value 
that bound together the various spheres of human activity.30All the 
other spheres—the political, aesthetic, erotic, intellectual, etc.—
were permanently released as separate, equal, and autonomous 
value spheres with corresponding central values as a result of dis-
enchantment.31 To describe the situation, Weber draws the anal-
ogy of a “return to polytheism,” of gods (value spheres) interlocked 
in an “eternal struggle” battling each other for human souls. In this 
schema, individuals can only “bear the fate of the times” and “choose 
which is god for him, and which is the devil.”32 Morgenthau puts it 
similarly: “Nations meet under an empty sky from which the Gods 
have departed.”33 !e operative word in Weber’s construction is 
“choose” because it illustrates the basic characteristic of the moder-
nity that Morgenthau adopted: modern beings, and communities, 
self-select their values from a near infinite catalog.
Within this typology, Morgenthau renders the political 
sphere to be primary because it is the focal point of human activity. 
Its unique attributes—access is universal (i.e., humanity consists 
of political beings) and the content is limitless (i.e., the pursuit of 
power, in the ontological sense that Morgenthau applies, can take 
any form by which men seeks to “assert themselves against the 
world”34)—present the potential for democratic flourishing and 
totalitarian barbarism. On the one hand, Morgenthau is optimistic 
that the universality and limitlessness of the political promote a 
high affinity for the development of democratic institutions and 
activities. “!e doctrine of democracy,” he writes eagerly of the po-
litical’s indeterminate content, “starts with the assumption that all 
citizens are potentially capable of arriving at the right political de-
cision and that, consequently, nobody has a monopoly of political 
wisdom.”35 To that end, he defends the political against the other 
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value-spheres whose natural tendencies are to infiltrate the political 
and “depoliticize” humanity by importing their absolute values (i.e., 
specific beliefs about religion, morality, and economics) into what 
is a principally open, indeterminate, and ideally democratic theater 
of contestation.
 On the other hand, however, Morgenthau recognizes the 
potential maladies embedded into the universality and limitless-
ness of the political sphere. He insists upon maintaining the ro-
bustness of the other spheres so that they can balance against the 
political to prevent it from consuming them and transforming hu-
man communities into “pure political communities” which is to say 
“total states.” To preserve a democratic political community against 
the dual specters of totalitarianism and depoliticization, Morgen-
thau aspired to contain and insulate the various value spheres via 
self-limitation and the division of power. !is practice of “balanc-
ing” unique independent competitive units constitutes a basis for a 
broader theory of international order.
II.  A POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER
From these conceptual foundations, I argue for a concept of 
international order centered on the moral value of political action, 
the state and the state-system. I begin the section by focusing on 
a series of lectures Morgenthau gave on Aristotle’s Politics. !ese 
lectures help us to better integrate Morgenthau’s arguments and to 
draw further connections that illuminate and consolidate his ideas.
I then turn to an exercise in what Rawls has called “ideal the-
ory.”36 !at is, I will build a political conception of international 
order using ideal units (i.e., the “ideal state,” “the ideal state system”) 
that function in an ideal fashion (i.e., reasonable competition and 
collaboration). Ideal theory entails two assumptions. First, that all 
actors (citizen and societies) generally comply with the principles 
of a politically conceived international order based on the moral 
value of political action we have identified. Ideal theory thus ideal-
izes away the possibility of law-breaking (i.e., aggressive war). Sec-
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ond, ideal theory assumes reasonably favorable social and economic 
factual conditions enabling nations to accept the principles in the 
first assumption. Starting with ideal theory provides us with the 
optimal example which, through "non-ideal theory," we will refer-
ence in order to reform our imperfect reality. Once we understand 
the ideal principles of international order, we will better see, for 
example, how the international community should act toward op-
pressive tyrannies and belligerent states that challenge the peace.
8LI4SPMXMGEP0MJIERHXLI1SVEP:EPYISJ4SPMXMGEP%GXMSR
 
!e political concept of international order I argue for begins 
with the moral value of political action. As we have seen, Morgen-
thau believed that political action constitutes a self-disclosing onto-
logical expression: men are driven to political action by the very na-
ture of their being and the exercise of such action fulfills their telos 
as homo politicus. In 1970, Morgenthau gave a series of lectures* 
at the New School on Aristotle’s Politics that elaborated on these 
beliefs. In them, he also began to express what he considered to be 
the moral value of the state. “Man cannot achieve his telos outside 
the state,” he said. “!e state is essential for the individual’s ability 
to achieve his purpose in life. Without the state, he could not do 
it.”37 Furthering and replicating Aristotle’s teleology, Morgenthau 
argues that because the political purpose of man—i.e., the “highest 
good”—depends upon the state, “the telos of the state is not just to 
ensure the bare survival of the citizens.”38 Rather, “it is not life as 
such that the state must preserve, but the good life.”39 
Morgenthau’s time at the New School overlapped with that 
of Hannah Arendt, a friend and romantic partner who was herself 
significantly influenced by Aristotle’s political thought. Like Mor-
genthau, Arendt based her political theory upon an analysis of the 
human condition. Her schema divides this condition into three 
fundamental activities: Labor, Work, and Action. !e first denotes 
* !ese lectures were transcribed and reprinted: Morgenthau, Anthony F. Lang Jr, ed., Political 
!eory and International Affairs: Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s !e Politics (Westport: 
Praeger, 2004). 
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activities that are necessary to survive, while the second refers to 
pursuits that seek, or otherwise involve, “artificial” inventions of the 
human experience.40 But it is with the third, “Action,” that she is 
most interested. 
In the human condition—which she describes as a “para-
doxical plurality of unique beings”41 sharing the same spatial uni-
verse—Action constitutes the self-disclosure of those unique be-
ings through speech, possible only in the presence of others who, 
“see and hear, and are hence capable of establishing the reality of 
subjective expression.”42 As Arendt explains, “In acting and speak-
ing, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique person-
al identities, and thus their make their appearance in the human 
world … !e disclosure of ‘who’ somebody is, in contradistinction 
to ‘what’ somebody is … is implicit in everything somebody says or 
does.”43 
!e point here is that Arendt’s “Action” and Morgenthau’s “po-
litical action” are analogous concepts that seem to be derived from, 
or at least partially influenced by, a common reading of Aristotle’s 
ontology. Most importantly, Arendt, like Morgenthau, advances Ar-
istotle’s position that political action is man’s purpose, the expres-
sion of his freedom, and that leading a political life—what Arendt 
called the vita activa—constitutes man’s ultimate aim: the political 
good life of which Morgenthau spoke. “A life without speech and 
without action,” she wrote, “is literally dead to the world; it ceases to 
be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.”44
But such a life was just what both theorists found in their 
evaluation of the “affluent society” that emerged in Western nations 
after World War II.  For them, the same kind of moral liberalism 
that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s was once again eroding the 
fullness and imperiling the security of human civilization. !e cul-
prits were decadent consumerism and the canonization of private 
pursuits. As the public and the political became penetrated by the 
private and the economic,45 Arendt lamented that, “fabrication has 
come to occupy a rank formerly held by political action.”46 “!e 
very concept of happiness which in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and Federalist refers to public happiness,” Morgenthau wrote 
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of America in 1960, “now takes on an exclusively private and pre-
dominantly material connotation.”47 Freedom, finally, was becom-
ing sublimated into unworthy chimeras like the unencumbered 
accumulation of personal property and beliefs about individual 
inviolability. It took on an apolitical meaning, connoting both anar-
chy and a chance for unhampered acquisition as well as signifying 
freedom not only from being ruled, but also from ruling others—
the freedom from politics altogether.48 
For both Morgenthau and Arendt, the interwar period and 
World War II proved that politics and the political life could nei-
ther be denied to individuals, nor ignored by statesmen in their 
calculations, without terrible consequences. !e lesson was not 
learned by many of their contemporaries. In turning their backs on 
what they were (i.e., political beings), modern men in the postwar 
period unknowingly debased themselves by inhibiting the fullest 
expressions of who they were. To someone that was at one time 
denied political personhood and subsequently threatened with 
extermination, the idea that men would voluntarily abdicate their 
essential humanity was shocking. Reviving, sustaining, and insti-
tutionalizing the political life became the guiding principle behind 
Morgenthau’s political philosophy and the basis for this political 
conception of international order.
III. IDEAL THEORY: THE MORAL VALUE OF THE STATE
!e state is at the center of Morgenthau’s political conception 
of international order and its moral value derives from its essential 
relationship to living the political “good life.” As we proceed, this 
derivation will shape the kind of state that he valorizes in particular. 
In his conceptual vocabulary, the state is the compulsorily or-
ganized form of society in modernity.49 !e polis, city-state, and 
kingdom had all, at one time, functioned as just such compulsory 
organizations. Drawing from Weber, Morgenthau posits that some 
level of social organization is always compulsory because domestic 
peace can only be preserved when a monopoly of violence is estab-
lished and organized.50 To Morgenthau, the modern state is the 
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broadest form of social organization that can realistically secure 
the resources necessary to provide physical security for its citizens 
without becoming so broad (i.e., becoming a world state) that it 
could no longer host a political debate framed by the particular 
moral and ideological convictions shared by a distinct political 
community.51 
But security, as Morgenthau noted is not the source of the 
state’s moral value.52 Rather, by enabling the individual to experi-
ence political community as a continuum in time and space, as a 
living idea in whose name men act, bestow, and draw benefits, the 
state facilitates freedom and the political good life.53 As Arendt ex-
plains, the state’s raison d’être is to establish and keep in existence 
“a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear, where freedom is 
a worldly reality, tangible in words which can be heard, and deeds 
which can be seen, and in events which are talked about, remem-
bered, and turned into stories before they are finally incorporated 
into the great storybook of human history.”54
!e state’s moral value in the context of the political life is 
therefore three-fold: (1) it provides and secures a public space for 
agent-disclosing political action; (2) it accumulates, organizes and 
distributes resources in a manner that enables individuals to ac-
cess and participate in the public space; and (3) it offers an object 
toward which political action in that space can be directed. It is the 
studio, palette, and canvas for homo politicus. In the first instance, 
the state extends institutions to essentially prohibit violence from 
poisoning the public space of appearances. !ese include police 
and military forces, but also communications regulations and posi-
tive laws that maintain a civil discourse. !e sum of these struc-
tures secures what Jean Cohen has called “the internal conditions 
of possibility for self-determination and self-government under 
law—i.e., for political freedom.”55
Because the freedom of the public life further requires the 
“conquest of necessity,” the state in the second instance serves to 
liberate citizens from the chains of subsistence—i.e., what Arendt 
referred to as Labor and Work.56 In modern times, states have de-
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the private economic lives of its citizens. Central banks, treasuries, 
and regulation boards all exist in part for the ostensible political 
purpose of ensuring that citizens have ample resources to be suf-
ficiently available for political participation. Many states have gone 
further to develop elaborate agencies and transfer programs to 
provide a base level of subsistence to the destitute. Some advanced 
democracies have even instituted public access broadcasting, or 
enacted fair-content requirements, to increase access to the public 
political forum to those with limited time and resources.57
In the third instance, the state functions as a three-dimen-
sional object for political action.58 As a political community’s real, 
shared entity existing in both space and time, the state constitutes 
the immediate substance to be shaped and molded by collective 
action, and simultaneously the physical record onto which words 
and deeds can be chronicled and celebrated by posterity. Further, 
and perhaps most decisively, the state as a personality emits an aura 
of patriotism that dramatizes and illuminates political action with 
what Arendt called the “shining brightness we once called glory.”59 
In each of these capacities, the state constitutes an essential compo-
nent of realizing the political good life Morgenthau identifies. 
It is important to note that a democratic constitution is not 
necessarily entailed by these criteria to establish moral value. Rath-
er, a state needs only to foster political inclusiveness and extend the 
experience of political community—i.e., the ability to participate in 
collective self-determining activities and struggles—to all citizens 
qua political equals in order to possess moral value, membership in 
the international community, and, as will be discussed, a legitimate 
claim to sovereignty. 
But within the context of ideal theory, it is the democratic 
state—one founded upon a republican model that reflects of the 
basic political equality and aspirations of humans qua speech-be-
ings—that Morgenthau identifies as an ideal-type.* Morgenthau 
* Critical republican political theorist Cecile Laborde describes this state as one in which, 
“all citizens enjoy basic but robust civic standing, in the form of political voice, basic personal 
autonomy, equal opportunities, material capabilities, and intersubjective mutual recognition 
as equal citizens.” Cecile Laborde, Critical Republicanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 11.
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further elaborates on what he means by the democratic state in 
various discussions of the United States. and its founding. Two 
features endear the United States to Morgenthau as an ideal form. 
First, the United States is premised on a decoupling of “nation” from 
“state.” While the former derives from immutable un-willed charac-
teristics of what someone is or appears to be (meaning ethnic, ra-
cial, territorial, or otherwise inherited traits of happenstance), the 
state springs from the willed expression of who someone actually 
is.* “!e United States,” he writes, “was founded upon loyalty not 
to a monarch or a piece of territory, but to a shared purpose,”60 a 
continued commitment to a shared constellation of values and be-
liefs substantiates a connection to the polity.61 Second, the United 
States is ideally democratic insofar as it “assumes that all members 
of society have equal access to the truth, but none of them have a 
monopoly upon it.”62 Dissent is emblematic of a democratic model 
that survives because of its value-pluralistic character and essential 
neutrality.† 
Morgenthau contrasts this type of epistemic democracy from 
both the dictatorial and Jacobin alternatives. In the former, a politi-
cal elite claims to possess a monopoly on truth (and therefore the 
“will of the demos”), and so justifies concentrating among them-
selves additional monopolies of power and law.‡ !e elite has then 
“not only the right, but even the duty to suppress dissent,” for dis-
sent quite literally becomes “tantamount to heresy and treason.”63 
In the Jacobin form, “the will of the majority is the ultimate source 
of truth in matters political,” and dissent represents a dismissible 
error in judgment. !e suppression of dissent is thus reinterpreted 
and justified as necessary civic reeducation.64 For Morgenthau, 
both alternatives stifle political self-disclosure in an attempt to ho-
* “!e disclosure of ‘who’ somebody is, in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is…is implicit 
in everything somebody says or does.” See: Hannah Arendt, !e Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 7.
† “Dissent is legitimate…because of the relativistic ethos that all types of democracy share.” Ibid., 
pp. 41. See also: Madison, !e Federalist 10 and !e Federalist 51. 
‡ Morgenthau’s democratic ideation seems to echo Lefort, for whom democracy was signified 
by an “empty seat of power” beneath which fluid and dynamic opposites competed for influence 
in a theater of contestation. See: Claude Lefort Democracy and Political !eory (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 15–17; pp. 256–57. 
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mogenize diverse beings into a single sterile whole.
By contrast, in the United States, “neither the minority nor 
the majority is vouchsafed the correctness of its views—both must 
argue and act on the conviction that they are right, a conviction 
tempered by the awareness of the possibility that they might be 
mistaken.”65 To Morgenthau, where both the majority and the mi-
nority, “remain within this relativistic ethos of democracy, while at 
the same time respecting those absolute objective principles that 
are beyond the ken of that relativism, the vitality of their contest 
will accrue to the vitality of democracy.”66
 Where it exists in such a form, and where it is addition-
ally capable of securing itself and conquering the necessities of its 
citizens, the state exists in its highest form. For Morgenthau, such 
states provide the building blocks for a politically conceived ideal 
state-system.
-HIEP8LISV]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Even if one accepts Morgenthau’s interpretation of the politi-
cal life and grants that some type of localized, neutral, and demo-
cratically organized political community is essential for its real-
ization, it remains plausible to ask, “why a system of territorially 
autonomous sovereign units”? Are there not, after all, avenues to 
pursue and preserve self-disclosing political action in other forms 
of social organization? Could not, for example, a world state facili-
tate the political life? 
In this section, I address why, from a political perspective, a 
state-system is the ideal form of world order. By exploring why a 
global state is an insufficient facilitator of the political life, we will 
be able to more clearly identify the attributes of the state-system 
that make it the ideal reflection of the human condition, the best 
institutionalization of the political life, and the most effective cura-
tor of them both. 
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In the mid-twentieth century, the experience of two world 
wars and the prospect of a third with thermonuclear weapons 
stirred up unprecedented agitation toward the formation of a 
world state. In the context of prolonged unspeakable catastrophe, it 
makes sense that security was of cardinal import to the statesmen 
and international scholars of the time. Convinced that only a global 
replication of the domestic security structure could secure interna-
tional tranquility, proponents of a world state aspired to concen-
trate a legitimate monopoly of violence in the hands of a central 
world authority.67
As justified as these proponents’ blind prioritization of secu-
rity might seem in such a situation, their judgment was void of a 
central consideration: the political. In effect, the object of the world 
state was, and still is, to eradicate international politics; to prevent 
different communities from communicating and contesting their 
disparate and often clashing interests that derive from the plural 
sets of values and priorities unique to each distinct political com-
munity.68 By overawing the voices of these diverse communities 
with a reconstituted global Leviathan, the world state denudes po-
litical communities of their expressive organs, stifling national con-
versations and their articulation in foreign policy. No world state 
can reflect the political organization of the human condition.69 
Rather, the state is the “recipient of man’s highest secular loyalties” 
precisely because it is the embodiment of his most basic political 
values.70 
In a value-pluralistic global terrain, a monolithic apolitical 
world state necessarily obviates the expression, and thereby deval-
ues and defies the formation, of those plural values.71 "e world 
state values only peace—but whose peace? Peace alone is a hol-
low virtue. Denied an international theater of independent interac-
tion and halted by the heavy hand of the global sovereign, political 
communities under a world state become reduced to depoliticized 
shells with men vulgarized into mere mammals. 
"e highest forms of human freedom and the expression of 
81Journal of Politics & Society
the political life depend upon a fluid, uninhibited vertical dynamic 
that the world state intrinsically crushes by its very establishment. 
Only a state-system can simultaneously reflect the diversity of the 
human condition and facilitate human freedom, while also utiliz-
ing characteristics of that system to preserve the conditions that 
secure diversity and the facilitate that freedom. !e sub-sections 
that follow explore these aspects, respectively. 
7SZIVIMKRX]EWER)\TVIWWMSRSJ8LI4SPMXMGEP
Within common law, the concept of sovereignty legally ex-
presses the independence and basic equality of political communi-
ties in their legally organized forms. In these capacities, sovereignty 
transfers into law the political fact that all political communities 
are comprised of persons endowed with speech and equal in their 
capacity to contribute to the staging and execution of public life. 
In the first instance, sovereignty imbues states with a type of legal 
independence to institutionalize their distinct political character. 
!is manifests at a basic level through the sovereign state’s supreme 
authority within a certain territory. More decisively, this means that 
a state is free to arrange its institutions and manage its internal and 
external affairs according to its discretion.72 !is includes, Mor-
genthau writes, 
!e right to give itself any constitution it pleases, to enact what-
ever laws it wishes regardless of their effects upon its own citi-
zens, and to choose any system of administration. It is free to 
have whatever kind of military establishment it deems necessary 
for the purposes of its foreign policy, which, in turn, it is free to 
determine as it sees fit.73 
In this positive dimension, sovereignty thus reflects the abil-
ity of a political community to freely and voluntarily define and 
project its values as interests in policy. Sovereignty in this respect 
dignifies the self-determining political beings that comprise a po-
litical community, and also recognizes the diversity intrinsic to the 
human condition. In the negative dimension, these principles are 
reinforced by the doctrine of non-intervention.
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In the second instance, sovereignty creates a category of le-
gal equality. !e “sovereign equality” of states is the basic principle 
of international common law,* and it is operatively manifested 
through the appearance of reciprocation structures: for example, 
in treaty-making, it surfaces through the doctrine of reservation; 
in diplomatic relations, through dual consent procedures; and in 
international adjudication and arbitration, through dual-consent 
or mutually pledged compulsory jurisdiction.74 !at similar struc-
tures are embedded throughout international common law signi-
fies that equality is a fundament of the state-system.75 In practice, 
the construction gives Panama an equal voice with the United 
States; symbolically, it legally imbues political communities with 
the same moral equality in marco-form that speech-beings share 
in the human condition, valorizing both the diversity of the human 
condition and the dignity of the political speakers.76 
7SZIVIMKR)UYEPMX]ERHXLI(MZMWMSRSJ4S[IV
For Morgenthau, the appeal of equilibrium seems to derive 
from Aristotle’s adage that virtue springs from self-limitation.77 In 
the international case, this refers to the virtue achieved when no 
single state can overwhelm the whole by dissolving, or subsuming, 
all the other various political communities into itself. More spe-
cifically, the appeal of an organic mechanism within a system com-
posed of independent states possessing diverse energies and inter-
ests, is the possibility to achieve stasis within that system without 
impeding either the plurality of political convictions or the autono-
my of the states issuing them. !rough the self-regulation of power 
“balancing” (i.e., the fluid alignment and realignment of sovereign 
units to sustain and equilibrium in which power remains divided) 
the state-system of sovereign independent units is therefore able to 
perpetuate itself, maintain the pluralistic character of the human 
condition, and secure the political integrity and self-determination 
of the states composing it. 
* It is certainly the foundational principle of the United Nations: “!e Organization is based on 
the principles of the sovereign equality of all its members.” (Article 2.1, U.N. Charter). 
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Functionally, and most importantly, a system of sovereign 
states is dynamic enough to resist “great power predations,” while 
stable enough to withstand fluctuations in the moral and politi-
cal attitudes of human communities.* !e idea is related to Mor-
genthau’s belief that, sociologically, the spheres of human activity 
in civil society need to be robust enough to counter the potential 
expansion of the others, and that, in a democracy, broad pluralism 
can be utilized to stage a contest that sustains democratic life by 
keeping power “an empty place.” 78 !e broader point Morgenthau 
makes in both instances is that equilibrium can be orchestrated be-
tween a pluralverse of autonomous units to secure the conditions 
(i.e., a division of power that blocks predation) necessary for the 
political good life to flourish.
But the division, or “balance,” of power is not a natural out-
growth of the international structure. Rather, it is a technique de-
pendent upon the calculations and judgment of statesmen accord-
ing to an ethic of national purpose (i.e., an ethic of responsibility) 
that fully considers the tactical and ethical consequences of their 
action, or inaction, upon not only their particular interests and 
values, but also universal values like the preservation of the state-
system and the conditions necessary to cultivate the political good 
life.79 !ese product of these considerations may at any point urge 
the formation of alliances, augmentation of armaments, redistribu-
tion of materiel, as well as diplomatic machinations, symbolic dis-
plays and—when the integrity and continuity of the state-system 
is threatened altogether by predatory imperialism or inexcusable 
tyranny that challenges the political lives of all peoples—even full-
fledged intervention and combat.† 
2SR-HIEP8LISV]-QTIVMEPMWQ(IWTSXMWQERH;EV
To this point we have been concerned with ideal theory. In 
* Jean Cohen finds moral value in the state-system for this reason as well. See: Cohen, 
“Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization,” Political 
!eory 36.4 (2008), p. 591.
† Morgenthau describes the World Wars as an instance of the latter. See: Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 215-18.
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extending a political conception of international order, we have 
developed an ideal conception of the conditions necessary to fa-
cilitate what we have been calling the “political good life,” includ-
ing its institutional and legal manifestation through the sovereign 
state system. A complete international normative vision, however, 
develops through questions arising from the non-ideal features that 
exist in reality. Beginning from the premise that there are at least 
some ideal political communities who themselves abide by, and 
hope to see all others eventually accept, the principles underlying 
the conditions necessary to facilitate the political good life globally, 
the task of non-ideal theory is to ask how these essentially demo-
cratic political communities should engage the other communities 
that do not abide by those principles, either at all or in their highest 
form. Our treatment of non-ideal theory in this section proceeds 
in two parts. First, it considers the problem of “imperial states” that 
pursue predatory foreign policies incongruent with the legal (i.e., 
territorial sovereignty and non-intervention) and moral (i.e., plu-
ralism and human freedom) principles of a politically conceived 
international order. Second, it considers the trouble presented by 
“despotic states” that are internally ordered, and which frequently 
act toward their own citizens, in defiance of those same principles. 
In the course of this second consideration, a third dilemma—that 
presented by non-ideal, but non-despotic states (i.e., those that are 
non-democratic yet legitimate)—is also considered. 
-QTIVMEP7XEXIWERH(IJIRWMZI;EV
An imperial state, in abrogation of legal and political prin-
ciples, seeks to impress its will upon other states at the expense of 
those states’ capacity to will independently. !is type of action—
whether by actual territorial expansion pursued with armed force 
or by significant interference in the essential internal politics of 
other nations—necessarily introduces violence into international 
politics by silencing the autonomous political agency of the other 
political communities (and the persons therein) that are its objects.* 
* Morgenthau discusses the various modes and expressions of imperialism in Chapter 5 of 
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In whatever degree, the imperial state thus demeans the political 
potential of individuals and their capacity to conduct themselves 
as citizens. Such action further reduces the pluralism in the global 
arena and, in the gravest circumstances, risks upsetting the stability 
of the state-system altogether by threatening to “occupy” (in the Le-
fortian sense) the global seat of power. Its mobilizations may there-
fore legitimately invite swift military retaliation, or indeed preemp-
tive military action, to sustain or “otherwise” reequilibrate relations. 
Non-intervention, a property of the moral value of the state, 
represents and transfers the political autonomy of the individual 
as a self-determining speech-being to the legal level of the commu-
nity. Violent action—which constitutes non-political action aimed 
at subjugation, and which in fact undermines political activity al-
together—forfeits a state’s claim to non-interference and permits, 
and may even invite, third-party intervention into its conduct. For 
example, a creditor state that moves to occupy a neighboring debtor 
state on the claimed basis of unpaid debts cannot offer its balance 
sheet as justification for its action.* "e act of territorial incur-
sion, by crossing the categorical threshold into violence, forfeits any 
sovereign protections for the negotiation of that debt and invites 
third-party actors to intervene in the affair. 
A political conception of international order consequently 
realizes that war is a legitimate political instrument in certain cir-
cumstances, and that there exists a clear, limited yet permanent 
need for war, no matter how states organize themselves (i.e., demo-
cratically, tyrannically, etc.). Early twentieth century moral liberals, 
in eager adherence to the ideas Kant developed in his essay “Per-
petual Peace,” had perilously equated democratic self-governance 
with peace and enlightenment. "ey went so far as to outlaw all 
wars except for those that pursued democratic “liberation,” with 
the idea that a world of democracies would decide that force is an 
obsolete instrument for the practice of international relations.80 
Morgenthau, in asserting the permanence of a limited right to war, 
Politics Among Nations. On this point, see also: Cohen, “Rethinking Democracy, Human Rights 
and Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization,” p. 591.
* See for instance Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. 
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was supremely critical of their conclusions. First, he rejected the 
notion that the proliferation of democracy would be sufficient to 
vanquish war once and for all. “"e question of war and peace is 
decided in consideration of permanent factors [geography, national 
character, tradition, the distribution of power] regardless of the 
form of government under which a nation happens to live.”81 War, 
he insisted, was a permanent if tragic feature of international poli-
tics, and nations, of whatever constitution, could be peaceful under 
one set of circumstances, and aggressive in another.82 Moreover, it 
is worth noting that accepting a doctrine of “democratic peace” cre-
ates a difficult-to-falsify claim that an imperial state might make to 
justify its belligerent ambitions. Similarly, by establishing a catego-
ry of democratic war premised on morality, moral liberals amplify 
the stakes of combat, excessively dramatizing war to the level that 
the means and ends of total warfare become justifiable objects. In a 
nuclear age, this is a dangerous norm to embed.  
Second, Morgenthau argued that the undesirability of estab-
lishing perpetual peace made attempts to abolish war by voluntary 
pacts of absolute abstention foolish overtures that imperiled the di-
vision of power as well as the conditions necessary for the political 
good life to flourish. “Liberal governments,” he wrote, “have fought 
their wars not upon a free choice between war and peace, nor at the 
moment most propitious to them, but upon the initiative of non-
liberal governments.”83 For Morgenthau, liberal U.S. policymakers’ 
general aversion to war-fighting masked the fact that a war against 
imperial fascism was a war enjoined by the national purpose of the 
United States, which is to say the universal principle to preserve 
the division of power and halt imperial states. “To deny that Fas-
cist imperialism constituted a threat to the American purpose at 
home and abroad,” Morgenthau wrote, “was to deny the evidence 
of one’s senses.”84 Deluded by an ideology that had been reified in 
law through meaningless agreements like the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
(1928), U.S. leaders who “did not want to fight in 1931 or 1935 or 
1938 on [favorable] terms,” had to fight in 1941 “on the terms of 
the enemy.”85
 Similarly, attempts to definitely codify binding legal cat-
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egories of legitimate war-fighting are problematic insofar as they 
inevitably run up against the reality of political events that only hu-
man judgment can navigate. To Morgenthau, these attempts to le-
gally define and standardize an absolute category of bellum injustum 
sacrificed human judgment to a vain legalism.86 At the precipice 
of war and grave consequence, only man’s imperfect wisdom can 
evaluate alternatives, select the most prudent, and execute accord-
ingly. While international criminal laws may be useful conduits to 
aggregate world judgment and establish norms for what constitutes 
illegitimate and imperial exercises of war power, they cannot—as 
interwar moral liberals sought, and as their modern-day counter-
parts still seek—a priori prohibit war-fighting altogether.87 
Rather, in accord with a political conception of international 
order that recognizes states as the principal agents in international 
affairs, it falls upon the community of nations to adjudicate the 
legitimacy of controversial international actions that violate prin-
ciples which transcend individual jurisdictions, deliberate possible 
courses of remediation, and generate consensus upon the chosen 
response, be it punitive, interventionary, or otherwise.
Some may find this construction uneasy and prone to issue 
arbitrary and inconsistent judgments. But the unease some may 
find with this construction comes, Morgenthau writes, from a fail-
ure to accept the ineluctable tragedy of political action:
In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage and mor-
al judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral 
destiny. "at this reconciliation is nothing more than a modus 
vivendi, uneasy, precarious and even paradoxical, can disappoint 
only those who prefer to gloss over and to distort the tragic con-
tradictions of human existence with the soothing logic of a spe-
cious concord.88
Moral dilemmas are inherent in political action, and espe-
cially difficult to resolve when it comes to identifying and remedi-
ating imperial states. Faced with these dilemmas, a politically con-
ceived international order chooses to resolve them through human 
judgment equipped with an ethic of responsibility rather than a 
“soothing,” but ultimately disengaged legalism. It trusts the politi-
88 7MIJJ&IX[IIR+PSFEP'MXM^IRWLMTERH)QTMVI
cal judgment of statesmen, and citizens, to weigh unquantifiable 
competing values and make the responsible choices.
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While for the past fifty years, the world has been generally 
successful at containing the territorial and political ambitions of 
imperial states, it has been less effective at dealing with the despotic 
states that continue to terrorize, oppress, and even murder persons, 
including their own citizens, within their borders. "e central 
complication plaguing efforts to address these states is an unclear 
standard for despotism. Imperialism, while perhaps not as clear as 
“aggression” as defined in international law, is by contrast a simple 
identification. A common but circular response is that despotism 
exists wherever human rights are violated, which is to say when 
foreign parties are motivated to intervene.* A political conception 
of international order strives to at least partially remedy this confu-
sion by developing a clearer conception of what constitutes a hu-
man right. In fact, there is not only a cogent political conception 
of human rights embedded within Morgenthau’s thought, but also 
one that suggests motivations for what we might deem as humani-
tarian intervention.
Morgenthau presented his ideas on human rights and hu-
manitarianism most clearly in a lecture at the Carnegie Council’s 
Center for Religion and International Affairs in 1979.89 "ough 
he affirmed to his audience that “there are basic moral principles 
applicable to all human beings,” he cautioned that these principles 
could not be expressed in terms of “natural” rights because such 
constructions necessitate reference to theological sources that “have 
very little to do with a philosophy.”90 Rather, for Morgenthau, 
rights can only be intelligible if they are conceived politically with 
reference to the collective actions and commitments of some politi-
cal community: 
I object to the concept of rights. "e concept of rights already 
presupposes a society that gives the rights. When you talk about 
* See the example cited in: Cohen, “Rethinking Democracy, Human Rights and Sovereignty in 
the Age of Globalization,” p. 584.
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natural rights, you assume the existence of a Divinity that is the 
King of the universe, in which there are rights.91 
Man’s right to have rights therefore involves membership in 
such a political community (the “society that gives the rights”) be-
cause he is a “political animal.” We have human rights not because 
we are, but rather because of what we are: political beings who 
require a community to disclose themselves and to encounter the 
meaning of freedom. !ough the extent and content of the rights 
men give themselves will vary, as Morgenthau notes, “both in time 
and place,” the decisive aspect is that men have the opportunity to 
give themselves rights at all, that is, to belong as members to a po-
litical community. 
But what kind of membership? Joshua Cohen, in positing one 
version of “politically conceived” human rights, argues that mem-
bership entails self-determination. He interprets this to mean ac-
cess to a political process that responds to the diverse interests and 
opinions of those subject to the laws and policies of the govern-
ment.* He further interprets self-determination to create human 
rights to dissent, expression, and even the right to receive justifica-
tions for public policies. Cohen claims that this threshold for mem-
bership does not amount to a “human right to democracy” because 
it still allows for polities (perhaps those that Rawls typifies as “bur-
dened societies” in !e Law of Peoples) to develop internal order-
ings that do not reflect an association of political equals. Yet, his 
broad construction, with its lofty threshold, greatly infringes upon 
the political principles embedded in the legal concept of sovereign 
equality.92 
A more suitable political conception of human rights, and 
one which seems to better correspond to Morgenthau’s position, 
derives from the principle of membership as inclusion.† !is con-
struction is perhaps best illustrated through the example of state-
* See: Joshua Cohen, “Is !ere A Human Right to Democracy?” in !e Egalitarian Conscience: 
Essays in Honor of G.A. Cohen, ed. C. Sypnowich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp. 226–48. For similar criticism of Joshua Cohen’s position, see: Jean Cohen, “Rethinking 
Democracy, Human Rights and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization,” pp. 585–86.
† Recall that this was the minimum standard, alluded to earlier, of what conditions would be 
required for a state to possess moral value and thus make legitimate claims to sovereignty.
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less persons. As Morgenthau noted, without the state, individuals 
cannot achieve their purpose as political beings.93 !is is because 
statelessness entails the loss of the relevance of speech and that of 
all human relationships. Men are only men insofar as they com-
mand the power of speech and live in a community. Excluded from 
political conversation, and de facto removed from political commu-
nities, stateless persons are lonely figures trapped outside the pale 
of human interaction. Denied access to the public realm, stateless 
persons lose their essential humanity and become easy targets for 
propagandists, tyrants, and demagogues. Only the loss of a polity 
itself, in this sense, expels men from humanity. 
Here we observe a contrast with the earlier discussed ex-
ample of the man trapped in a less-than-democratic state. !at 
man, though his voice is muffled by tyranny, still possesses his basic 
ability to speak and protest. Ignored and beaten, such a man still 
joins his compatriots in ancient song, Hine ma-tov u’ma-nayim, she-
vet akh-im gam ya-had—“how good and sweet it is when brothers 
dwell together in unity!”94 Meanwhile, the stateless man has no 
brothers  with whom he may dwell, no song to be sung, and no 
protest to stage. !ey are, as Morgenthau was, “ausgeschlossen und 
ausgestossen” (excluded and expelled).95 To speak of human rights 
is therefore to speak of the right to access an arena in which, as 
Michael Walzer described it, “freedom can be fought for, and some-
times won.”96
A despotic state, therefore, is one that exerts exclusionary 
pressures on a community to the point of committing it to a po-
litical death.* !e Holocaust, for instance, was a “moral outrage”97 
to Morgenthau which, unlike other moral judgments of political 
action, could not be relativized and tolerated as a product of “di-
verse attitudes” toward to the value of human life. !e organized 
depoliticization of the Eastern European Jewish community that 
culminated in their “mass extermination,” Morgenthau wrote in 
1948, must be abhorred “by virtue of an absolute moral principle 
* To reformulate an earlier point, we might say that the danger in what Morgenthau typified as 
“nation-states” can thus be restated as the risk that they will lapse into “despotism” by excluding 
certain populations from public life on the basis of the ethno-nationality. 
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the violation of which no consideration … can justify.”98 !eir to-
tal dehumanization and near elimination, Morgenthau wrote, “was 
based upon something different from religion.”99 !at is, the fact 
that, “a Jew, by his very existence, denied the universalistic aims and 
philosophies” of the !ird Reich, and was therefore unfit to partici-
pate in public life.100 Political and eventually physical annihilation 
“became inescapable” because the Jews, like the Roma, gays, and 
other non-Aryan groups, represented a pluralism that the Reich 
could not justify.101 
Understood in this way, sovereign equality cannot be claimed 
by states to shield themselves from interventionist action should 
the community of nations agree that a violation of the principle 
of membership has occurred. Genocide treaties have begun to ac-
cumulate what amounts to a similar principle, though a political 
conception advises future authors to carefully specify the inclusive 
political grounds (opposed to vague statements about human dig-
nity and the value of life) upon which the protections in their trea-
ties are based. It would be better to codify such a principle, appro-
priately substantiated with proper references to political inclusion, 
into hard international law. Any such codification or treaty should 
ultimately make clear that any violation of human rights (i.e., ex-
clusion, political death) is subject to international intervention 
should a properly constituted body representing the international 
community confirm such a violation.
A different calculus applies to proposed interventions target-
ing non-democratic, but non-despotic states (i.e., non-ideal yet le-
gitimate states). Contra those who might claim that a “human right 
to democracy” justifies such interventions, a political conception 
holds that the universal validity of the democratic political ethos 
can be realized if, but only if, democracy is independently ascer-
tained and pursued through the self-determined political action of 
the people. If there exists the possibility of influencing the laws and 
institutions that govern them (i.e., access to a theater of contestation 
as political equals), it is for the members of the self-asserting po-
litical community to ensure for themselves that the claims made in 
that theater are ultimately respected by the government. “All human 
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beings want to be free, and, hence, want to have those opportunities 
for self-expression and self-development,” Morgenthau wrote.102 A 
political conception of international order thereby holds democracy 
to be an idea to which all men intuitively aspire. Self-development, 
as a principle of democracy, therefore requires democratic states to 
limit their proliferative activities to what amounts to a type of pas-
sive evangelization. Unlike Wilson and contemporary hegemonic 
liberals who wanted “to transform the world through the will of the 
United States,” Morgenthau held that it is the obligation of demo-
cratic states to “attract the rest of mankind through their example,” 
and not to “impose” these principles upon other nations.103 To do 
otherwise and intervene wherever authoritarianism existed would 
be to deny members of a political community the opportunity to 
determine for themselves their government, laws, and, as Jean Co-
hen points out, the “learning processes entailed by their struggles 
(including the ability to compromise) to create a more inclusive po-
litical process, more just laws, and new interpretations of rights.”104 
Morgenthau, in his day, held that military force could not 
be levied in Vietnam to halt or install ideas that are “political in 
nature.”105 While it was reasonable to oppose the Soviets in Eu-
rope, where throughout the Cold War there was a tangible military 
threat that the Russians would expand imperially through Berlin 
and along the Iron Curtain, the ideological nature of the “threat” 
in Southeast Asia did not merit even limited combat.106 !e val-
ues chosen and expressed by the Vietnamese polity were, in other 
words, for the Vietnamese to decide for themselves and not for 
the United States to oppose or demean. To do otherwise would 
depoliticize the Vietnamese political community and deprive its 
citizens of their most basic political agency. As the major power in 
that region, Morgenthau believed it was natural that Chinese com-
munist ideology would influence the thinking of self-determining 
Vietnamese in the construction of their own government and the 
formulation of their political values. !e United States needed to 
recognize this political and cultural influence “as a fact of life,” and 
focus instead on rhetorically and diplomatically encouraging dem-
ocratic elections in Vietnam that would allow the country to flour-
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ish as a Titoist state, free from the imperial regional ambitions of 
either the Soviet Union or China.107 “!ose universal principles,” 
Morgenthau wrote, “were not to be exported by fire and sword if 
necessary, but they were to be presented to the rest of the world 
through…successful example.”108 
A politically conceived international order thus only consents 
to a limited category of “humanitarian intervention.” Additionally, 
against the assertions of some of the more enthusiastic cosmo-
politan liberal theorists like Kor-Chak Tan and Carla Bagnoli, a 
politically conceived international order holds that potential “hu-
manitarian” actions incited by despotism are by no means morally 
obligated.* As Morgenthau said at the CRIA lecture, “the norma-
tive force of the [universal moral] code is qualified by potential 
considerations. I mean what we call circumstantial ethics.”109 As 
Stephen Wertheim rightly observes, though the language of abso-
lute obligations “enchants us,” drawing as it does on a “moral purity 
that aspires to transcend the political,” such ethics of ultimate ends 
focus upon whether we are moral, not how to act to actually benefit 
others.110 !e decision to act, or in this case intervene, must not 
be decoupled from considerations of how that action or interven-
tion will be executed. If these considerations of the “how” reveal 
consequences and scenarios that exacerbate the evil or undermine 
the objectives of the action altogether, then the action should not 
proceed. From the perspective of a political conception, this is the 
ethically responsible decision. !e blind establishment of a duty 
to confront evil as a reflexive norm of international politics (i.e., an 
incontrovertible “responsibility to protect”) would, in its defiance of 
politics, divert attention from helping victims to challenging evil-
doers themselves. Even when it is substantiated by the appropriate 
precepts and perspectives, such a backward, decadent humanitari-
anism that in a sense glorifies the righteousness of liberators above 
the welfare of the damned cannot be countenanced. Judgment, un-
easily, remains a statesman’s best and only recourse. 
* See: Kor-Chak Tan, “!e Duty to Protect,” in Nomos XLVII: Humanitarian Intervention, 
eds. Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (New York: NYU Press, 2006), pp. 84–116; Carla 
Bagnoli, “Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Moral Duty: A Kantian Perspective,” in 
Nomos, pp. 117–40. 
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IV. BETWEEN GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AND EMPIRE
Contra the liberal cosmopolitan and liberal hegemonic posi-
tions, the above political conception posits a “dualist” concept for 
international law and order. !is concept reconciles human rights 
as inclusion (which legally represent man’s need for the polity) 
with sovereign-equality (which legally represents the equal status 
of political beings and the diversity of possible value-orientations 
in a post-differentiated modernity). !e dual basis for this inter-
national order creates a new human legal-political status between 
the global citizenship of the cosmopolitan liberals, and the imperial 
vassalage of the hegemonic liberals.
0IKEP'SRGITXWJSV-RXIVREXMSREP3VHIV
In the cosmopolitan model that Habermas describes, indi-
viduals are doubly citizens of a polity and a global community. By 
contrast, under the dualist concept of international law espoused 
by a politically conceived international order, individuals are ex-
clusively citizens of a sovereign state. However, all of those states, 
without relinquishing their sovereign status, are themselves subject 
to the selective penetration of global governance institutions and 
international laws. 
!e reconciliation of the seemingly antithetical proposition 
is accomplished by embracing what Neil Walker and Jean Cohen 
term “constitutional pluralism.”* Constitutional pluralism begins 
from the premise that there have been “shifts in the substantive 
rules of sovereignty” as a result of “the emergence of a function-
ally differentiated autonomous global legal order” that makes its 
own claims to autonomy, supremacy, and constitutional quality 
“alongside the continuing claims of states.”111 It is thus feasible to 
decouple the internal supremacy of a state’s laws from the idea that 
states possess exclusive legal jurisdiction over their persons and ter-
* See: Neil Walker, “!e Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,” Modern Law Review 65 (2002): 
3; Jean Cohen, “Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist 
Perspective,” in !e Philosophy of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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ritories. 
!is is not to propose a radical redefinition of state sover-
eignty. Sovereignty, as has been argued, is a powerful normative 
category that extends beyond basic moral principles to protect the 
self-determining actions of members of a political community. It 
preserves their capacity to judge and amend the character of their 
government and its institutions as they see fit. Sovereignty cannot 
be reduced, for example, to a “responsibility to protect.”112 Rather, 
the move to a “pluralist” or “dualist” approach recognizes that the 
sovereignty argument is not unfalsifiable and indeed limited by 
universal political values (i.e., human rights as inclusion) consistent 
with the normative political principles that justify the sovereignty 
argument in the first place. As alluded to in the preceding section’s 
discussion of how the international community should engage im-
perial and despotic states, a constitutional pluralist position merely 
establishes that the international political community may legiti-
mately refer to international law to reject a state’s sovereignty argu-
ment and justify interventionist or punitive action. 
As Jean Cohen notes, global governance institutions, espe-
cially those with coercive power (i.e., those currently possessed 
by the UN Security Council), need to be universally inclusive and 
operate using rules and procedures that incorporate the inputs of 
all states.113 !is would prevent a partial transference of jurisdic-
tion from abolishing sovereignty while ensuring that decisions 
that reject the sovereignty argument still legitimately represent the 
consensus of the international community. Without this step, the 
legality, legitimacy, and general concert of the politically conceived 
international order falls apart. A general prescription of this thesis 
is therefore an exhortation to immediately begin the hard process 
of reforming these institutions.* 
To be sure, the application of an inclusive principle contrasts 
with other noted concepts for international order (namely Rawls’ in 
!e Law of Peoples) by avoiding the “creation of radical rightlessness 
* Since, as with domestic political institutions, these global governance institutions will be 
“susceptible to hegemonic capture,” democratic reforms that keep power divided also seem to be 
appropriate. See: Ibid., p. 597.
96 7MIJJ&IX[IIR+PSFEP'MXM^IRWLMTERH)QTMVI
and lawlessness zones” (i.e., the designation of what Rawls called 
“outlaw states”) that fall outside the coverage of international law 
because they fail to accept the basic principles that undergird the 
international system.114 Contra Rawls, criminal governments and 
persons are subject to the sanctions of international law under a 
politically conceived international order “precisely because” they are 
members of international society.115 !is adds not only the benefit 
of internal theoretical consistency, but it also avoids what Morgen-
thau considered the risk of excessively amplifying the brutality of 
conflict and punishment through the implicit “dehumanization” of 
agents and entities labeled “outside” of humanity.116 
!e human political status created by a politically conceived 
international order is therefore one that sidesteps global citizen-
ship (by salvaging a concept of the political through its legal repre-
sentation in sovereignty) and vassalage (by categorizing the impe-
rial hierarchy proposed by hegemonic liberals as a violation of basic 
normative principles). It affirms and secures the political dignity 
of individual citizens, including protections from the predations of 
their own governments. 
Against the false choice between cosmopolitan and hege-
monic liberalism, this political conception shows an appreciation 
for man’s political nature and his need of polity by concurrently cel-
ebrating and institutionalizing the eminent goodness of the public 
political life. Since the end of the Cold War, influential democratic 
states have regularly neglected the long-term ramifications of their 
actions in their haste to confront evil. As the normative structure of 
the social world has consequently bent toward the liberal discourse 
of human security, the extension and cultivation of the public po-
litical life—the “good life”—has been imperiled. Without a robust 
alternative to compete with dialogically, it is unsurprising that the 
liberal discourse has so far prevailed. Ideas must be mobilized that 
can supply an alternative to challenge existing liberal modes of 
thought and salvage the political life from decadence, despotism, 
and hegemonic usurpation.
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